IF Introduction sn this pper we explin iEIS trde reltions with the gentrl ist iuE ropen gountries @giig9sA employing the method of the redution to the surdF e suppose tht smll ountry mrket my e used s outlet for dumping lrge ountry9s mrket surplus so tht so tht trde poliy spe dened with import quots restriting exports is retlitory stne etween two ountries of symmetri mrket sizeF e prove the supposition wrong uilding up model tht ounts for the symmetry of the prtners while enE ompssing oth onit nd oopertion fetures of the strtegi intertion in trdeF gonit is reeted in the level of retlitory mrket ess modeled through the men of oth import nd export quotsF goopertion is indued through politil negotitions on the level of mrket essF sn this wy deE ned trde reltions t perfetly in the governmentl welfre funtion dened y qrossmn8relpmn @IWWSA 1 whih minimized independently provides the politilly lest eptle importGexport quots in ontrst with the ommon welfre governmentl funtion whih provides the politilly eptle level 1 The governmental welfare function is discussed in detail when we present the model. 1 of importGexport quots tht oth governments would gree through negoE titions 2 F he outome of the internl politil negotitions on the level of mrket ess re in the prmeter tthed to the ntionl welfre whih is higher the higher re the politil pressures for exporting respetively more protetion is need itF sn line with the previous studies s well s the prE tie of trde lierliztionD we study the strtegi intertion in trde etween giigEs nd the iuropen nion fousing on single setor with the highest onit potentilF hree of the gii ountries nd the iuropen nion re min wine produers in the world shring high exporting potentil while i is fing wine mrket surpluses dministered even through distilltionF gonE fronted with suh sitution it might e rgued tht the giig9s mrkets ould hve een used s n outlet for iuropen exports whih oupled with low mrket ess points retlitory type of trde reltions on wine mrketF e strt the nlysis onsidering tht retlition n e plyed with oth import nd export quots even if the outome of the non oopertive gme is still ontroversil in the litertureF etlition with oth import nd exE port quots hs een modeled y owers @IWURAD yropoulosD hinopoulos nd ureinin @IWWSAD xoritsugu xknishi @IWWWA ut retlition is plyed with 9opE timum quots9 whih would mximize eh ountry9s welfreF ixept owers @IWURAD utrky ws not found to e the outome of retlitory gmeF sndeed iISEgiig reltions hve not een utrki suggesting tht the hypothethE il sitution in the eginning might e wrongF st ws xoritsugu xknishi @IWWWA who suggested tht the diversity of results might e due to the xsh equilirium onept so tht our ontriution to the strnd of reserh is to ensure tht the retlitory gme is plyed strting out from the onit point of the nonEoopertive gme in trde tht is the point where eh government minimizes the governmetl welfre individullyF e plot the disgreement point of the nonEoopertive gme within the topologil spe representing interntionl trde nd we show tht the retlitory poliy spe dened y 9importEexport9 quots is not xsh equilirium therefore not solution of the retlitory gme ut n improvement from the worse outomeF yur result supports wilner9s @IWVVA rgument tht highly exporting rms re not likely to loy for protetion in fer of foreign retlition even if the setor9s import penetrtion rtio is highF sing the linkge etween export dependene rtiosD import penetrtion rtios nd internl politil pressures in giig strtegi trde reltions with iEIS for wine setor we show tht exports do not rry retlitory onit potentil on the ontrryD they re etter outome of the strtegi intertion in trdeF he model is pplied to the i trde reltions in wine setor with omniD fulgri nd rungry whih est exemplies the evolution pth from utrkyD retlition nd oopertion through oth restritive import quots nd highly expnsionist volumes of exportsF sn the next setion we expliitly determine the xsh equilirium of the retlitory gme with oth import nd export quots s well s mrket symE metries nd we provide evidene tht exports re n improvement from the worse outome of the nonEoopertive gmeF sn etion Q we illustrte the xsh ehvior on trde reltions etween i nd giig9sF trting out from retlition we empirilly show tht negotitions hve helped to inrese the mrket ess nd to void the onit possily generted y lrge dierene in mrket potentilF gonlusions out the model nd further diretions of reserh re sujet of the lst setionF PF The Model e model onit in trde reltions in interntionl politil eonomy fshE ion in two ountries two goods generl equilirium frmework using govE ernmentl welfre funtion introdued y qrossmn nd relpmn @IWWSAD G C a C C C a C W C F gountries hve similr politil nd eonomi struE tureF C C is the loy mpign ontriution for setting up quot while a C is the vlue tht the government tth to the ntionl welfreD W C F he loy ontriutions nd the vlue of the governmentl weight is higher in exporting ountries nd lower in the importing onesF qovernments ount on rents nd exE port lienses revenues in their welfre funtionF ih ountry exports one good nd imports the foreign sustituteF rodution nd onsumption frontiers re ontinuous liner funtions of prieD Y C a Cp C D Y C X R + 3 R nd respeE tively X C a A Bp C D X C X R + 3 R while p C a @p 1 ; ::::; p j A is the prie vetor for j a I; ::::; n: he set of fesile onsumption undles X C of the ountry C is the list X C : vet E C e the ddiE tive inverse of E C so tht I C a E C a X C Y C denotes ountry C imE portsF hus the oer urve is llowed to end k towrds the xis representE ing imports so tht ower9s restritive ssumption of elstiity of imports is elimintedF snterntionl trde is hrterized y the one dimensionl spe Proof. e determined the inuene of the trde poliy hoie on terms of trde using imports nd exports denitions s follows @for omprtive purposes see fond nd rk @PHHHAAD sn expression @SAD symmetry in the nonEoopertive prolem extends the solutions set to the fourth qudrnt of the orthogonl xes so tht so tht rome ould retlite with either n import or n export quot ginst n import quot set y poreignF Proposition 1. Changing players identities changes the outcome of the game, therefore imports and export quotas cannot be at the same time a Nash equilibrium.
roposition I implies tht one of the outomes of retlition tht we should e onerned with is stilityF et this point we hve only one result whih is stle for further nlysis of iISEgiig trde reltionsF e retlitory stne of lrge exporting ountry is in ft tight import quotF por the smll ountryD higher mrket size of its trding prtner enlrges the rnge of poliy options so tht its retlitory est response my e either n import quot or retlitory inrese in the volume of exports or othF vooking up t the previous result through the lnes of the xsh equiliriumD if eh government seeks individully n equilirium in trde reltionsD the poliy hoie tht rings retlition hs to follow the usul xsh propertiesF prom llD symmetries in the xsh equilirium is the most worrying euse when the retlitory gme is plyed with symmetri plyers it should not e expeted vritions in the xsh equilirium trde reltionsF xsh xioms imply tht eh plyer should know when trding prtner poliy option is retlition nd whih one is his est response to suh sitution so tht proposition I implies tht the stndrd symmetri property of the disgreement set is not veriedF e ould ntiipte tht either the 9importEimport9 or the 9importE export9 retlitory poliy spe is not xsh solution of the gme so tht we hek invrine @sxA property of the xsh equilirium solutionF @sxA he ne trnsformtion of the symmetri disgreement points is quite strightforwrd sine the disgreement points of two symmetri ountries d H 0 ; d F 0 ¡ a @IGQA z H Y H ; z H Y H ¡ ts perfetly in the ne form md C C n for @VA m P R + ; n P R: uppose rst tht the retlitory poliy spe is given y import quotsF fy men of trnsformtion md C C n a mz C Y C mt C n; m P R + ; n P R F henoting mt C n y r D mz C Y C C r vries with mz C P R + ; r P R; P N following ny ne trnsformtion of the type md C C n: sf the retlitory poliy spe is given y oth import nd export quots then md C C n a mz C Y C mt n; m P R + ; n P R: henoting mt n y r 0 ; mz C Y C C r vries with mz C = P R + ; r 0 P R; P N: ixport quots do not follow the ne trnsformtions of the retlitory pointF Proposition 2. The retaliatory policy space dened with 'import-export quotas' is not a Nash equilibrium of the retaliatory game.
sndeedD invrine of the xsh solution is not veried if retlition is plyed y the smll ountry with n inresed volume of exportsF e retlitory poliy spe dened with retlitory exports ginst lrge ountry9s tight import quot is not xsh solution of the nonEoopertive gme nd the hypothesis presented in the eginning for iISEgiig reltions ws wrong (Q.E.D)F purtherD in order to explin the result from roposition P the next property of the xsh solution helps us to sort out the relevnt solution of the gme from the nonExsh solutions while delineting the retlitory types of poliy opyions from the nonEretlitory onesF @IRRA I=QA@d H 00 ; d F 00 ¡ a E H ; I F ¡ @UA Proposition 3. A trade policy space dened by import and retaliatory export quotas is an irrelevant solution of the non-cooperative game, moreover it is an improvement from the disagreement set.
he result n e justied nd visully onrmed in the topologil spe of the interntionl trde employing the next xiom of the xsh solutionF @eA sn the lst expression @RA of the retlitory disgreement point it n e showed the impt of rome9s export quot on the disgreement setF eE ording ylson @IWTSA the there is less power of ollusion in the lrge ountry so tht a F < a H : hereforeD z F > z H nd the import quot of the lrge ountry is not restritive for the smll ountry9s exports sine z F Y F C t > z H Y H t: his reltionship is not retlitory stne in trde reltions etween two symmetri ountriesF woreoverD in eqution @RA the smll ountry my inE rese its exports without hnging the retlitory stne of the lrge ountry ontrditing the reto improving requirement of the xsh solutionF st is possile to expnd exports inresing internl prodution till the prie dierE entil is elimintedF et limitD when t a H the ountries re symmetri nd the retlitory disgreement point is the one in expression @PAF pigure P here @weui ewwA sn pigure P the disgreement set of two symmetri ountries is dierent from the set of two symetri ones so tht the symetri property of the nonEoopertive solution must e one gin ensured forF feE use of the indued symmetryD we serh those ommon disgreement points omplying with the xsh solution propertiesF por this we ompre the set of symmetri disgreement points with the symmetri onesF sn the eqution @PA nd @RAD the import quot of the rome ountry delines y t in the symmetE ri se s ompred to the symmetry d H 00 < d H 0 so tht we my onsider the symmetri set of disgreement points dened y imports quots inluded in the symmetri set nd ithin eqution @VAD h vries inversely relted with t: e hnge in the prmeters dening prodution nd onsumption funtion will determine proE portionl hnges in oth ountries9 pries therefore we n onlude tht ountry nnot e mde etter o without worsening the retlitory prtnerF snresed openness of one ountry won9t deter its strtegi prtner from tightE ening the protetionist stneF he mrket size limit is neessry ondition for h to e reto improving nd the hnge is less thn proportionl when P @I; IA : sn the gure P is depited the reto frontier of D purther we re onerned with the impt of the dierene in mrket size on the retlitory stne etween ountriesF et rst glne we might e tempted to onlude tht inresing dierenes in mrket size y vrying the prmeter pushes the trde equilirium wy from the retlitory one nd the lrge ountry my freely inrese its openness without hnging the other ountry9s retlitory stneF roweverD suh onlusion would violte the reto onE strint of the xsh solutionF he reto xiom is veried if we notie tht inresing dierenes in mrket size determines deese in prie dierentil nd prodution potentil so tht reto improving equilirium hngesF sn order to e mintined the mrket size inrese hs to e less thn the prie dierentil derese nd prodution potentil lossF uppose tht 00 is higher dierene in mrket size whih determines lower prie dierentil @p F lso dened y import quots s the xsh equilirium solution of the nonEoopertive gme in the poreign ountryF fut h with d F " dened in this wy is not reto improving nd this explins why ountries my oth improve the retlitory stne without eing neessry one to e worse o thn eforeF sn dditionD the smll ountry nd itself in etter sitution tht the retlitory stne for very smll dierenes in mrket sizeD P @H; IAF gonsequentlyD inresing the mrket size y vrying the prmeter s the iuropen nion lredy proeeded through enlrgement pushes the trde equiE lirium wy from the retlitory oneF he question isD re there ny limits to enlrgementc he nswer is xoF As long as the price dierential included in t exists and can be eliminated through political pressure for lower protection in the small country while the large country's exports expand, the dierence in market size may be increased. 3 sn the next setion we empirilly show tht the ove ojetive n e ttined using enlrgement negotitions s proxy for the politil pressureF he nlysis revels tht the trde poliy spe dened with import quot is the only xsh equilirium of the retlitory gme etween n lrge exporting ountry nd smll importing oneF prom I H P T 1 ; I F P T ? then I H ; I F a H D I H a H or I F a H: sn other wordsD t lest one ountry hooses utrky s poliy optionF e mrket surplus my e eneil for retlitory trde if it is not ssoited with n importnt impt on pries nd prodution potentilF woreoverD n export quot s retlitory stne ginst lrge ountry import quot is etter outome euse it retes premises for etter mrket essF As long as the price dierential exists and can be eliminated through political pressure for lower protection in the small country while the large country's exports expand, the retaliatory import quota of the small country is not restrictive for the small country;s exports. puthermoreD if y wilner @IWVVA the smll ountry9s exporters fer retlition nd the politil pressure for protetion dereses llowing etter mrket ess for the lrge ountry9s exportsF hereforeD an import quota may increase at the same time with the volume of export increase and the supposition in the introduction was wrong.
hese ndings explin why i9s exports on gentrl ist iuropen mrkets hve not een ssoited with utrky in trde reltions ut with enlrgementF sn the next setion we explore the retlitory potentil in iISEgiig trde reltions sed on the xsh equilirium of the nonEoopertive gmeF e further show the impt of the dierene in the mrket size nd of the vrying politil pressure through negotitions on the retlitory stneF e further provide the empiril support to the lim tht high volumes of exports re not deterring oopertion in trde reltionsF RF Empirical analysis 4.1 Data and methodology sn this pper we hve determined the retlitory disgreement point in the spe determined y the optimum import respetively export quots or the dierene etween the ntionl prodution nd onsumption potentilF porE mllyD where the nlysis of the dierene in mrket size nd politil negotitions impt is relted to the smll ountry9s retlitory stneF he dependent vrile is the smll ountry9s import penetrtion rtio s ompred to its import dependeneF he independent vrile I is eh on his turn the imE port dependene respetively export dependene of the smll ountry when we ontrol for the dierene in mrket size P nd dummy vrile Q for strtE ing the enlrgement negotitionsF he import penetrtion rtion is dierent from the trditionl denition euse the oserved level of imports etween ountries is repled with the dierene etween the internl prodution nd the internl onsumptionF he optimum trde ows s dierene etween prodution nd onsumption hve een previously estimted empirilly y 10 fldwin @IWUIA through the vetor of djusted net exports 4 for the empiril test of reksherEyhlin modelF sn our model the vetor of the optiml trde ows is similr ut the empiril estimte nnot e mde using djusted net exports euse in the dt one ountry9s imports re the other ountry9s exE ports so tht we nnot lulte the orresponding vetor of djusted net exports for the opposing plyer in the strtegi intertionF e then ompute the dierene etween prodution nd onsumption for optimum export quotD respetively imports minus exports for optimum import quotF sn pigF Q we plot the djusted net exports of the smll ountries in the smple ginst the optimum trde owsF he djusted net exports representing the tul trde lne for wine is lower thn the optimum trde ows so tht if the model is veried empirilly t the optimumD the tul lower volumes of net exports were not retlitoryF Figure 3 . etul versus optimum exports @9HHHHHHhlA he dummy vrile is used s proxy for the prmeter repersenting the internl politil pressure nd we model it s qulittive vrile interting with eh other vrile dening the modelF o tht the rest of the vriles pture the eets of the intertion etween the politil option of eing inE volved in negotitions or not on the protetionist stne nd the more omplex intertion with the dierene in mrket sizeF e hve olleted dt from the gliforni ine snstitute for the iuropen nion9s wine setorF yur dt overs period of eleven yers etween IWWS nd PHHS for three ountries @omniD rungry nd fulgriA inluded in interntionl sttistis s min wine produers on the world mrket nd t the sme time trding prtners for the iEISD ndidtes to enlrgement nd involved in negotitions for trde lierliztionF his hoie of the ountries is one of the most pproprite euse the IWWSE PHHS time spn inludes vriility in the internl politil pressure for trde Table 1 . orld hierrhy of wine produersD gliforni ine snstitute opennessF he ountries hve strted enlrgement negotitions t dierent points in time so tht it should e possile to ssess the impt of lower politil pressure fter the opening of negotitionsF he model suggests tht A n inrese in one9s plyer import quot doesn9t hnge the retlitory stne of the opposing prtner @EAF feuse of orthogoE nllyD the import quot is repled y the export quot s dependent vrile nd we expet the sme slopes ut the opposite signF es the model lso suggestsD A the smll ountry9s import penetrtion rtio inreses to permit higher ess for the lrge ountry9s exportsF @CA relen wilner @IWVVA hs een extensively nlyzed the linkge etween the internl protetionist pressures nd the import penetrtion respetively export dependene rtioF por the smple of dt t hndD in le P we show how wilner9s onlusions tht higher glol interdependene trigger more trde openness my e pplied for i nd omniD fulgri nd rungry nd why we expet sttistilly signint result for retlition with exports eing etter outome for interntionl trde reltionsF sn IWWSD ve yers fter the ollpse of the ommunist regime in gentrl ist iuropen ountriesD the eonomi reminisenes of the utrki stne in trde re still oviousF sn the eonomi literture there is rod onsensus regrding the isoltionist eonomi stne whih hs een hrteristi for the giig9s eonomies during 9VH nd erly 9WHF he dt in the le P gives us importnt informtion of wht tully isoltion mentF ht is A high export dependene rte for ll istern iuropen ountries in the smple nd A very low import penetrtion rtio for i exportsF e notie high rtes of wine exports nding mrket ess on iuropen mrketF woreoverD there is n ovious imlne etween the volumes of exports whih hve fr IWWT  PHHS  IWWT  PHHS  omni  Q  R  SQ  PP  iEIS  Q  I  HFHV  HFI  IWWT  PHHS  IWWT  PHHS  fulgri  HFR  R  QHH  RP  iEIS  T  I  HFHHP  HFHR  IWWS  PHHS  IWWS  PHHS  rungry  S  PW  IHQ  TV  iEIS HFHV P Q HFS ygiX euthor9s lultions using x gomtrde dt Table 2 . 9esisting protetionism9 in gentrl ist iuropen gountriesD IWWSEPHHS exeeded the ntionl optimum exports while the imports penetrtion rtios re very lose to the level we hve dened s eing retlitoryF sn IWWSD we lulted the retlitory rtes s eing R in omniD PP in fulgri nd V in rungryF he import penetrtion rtios were ll lower thn the retlitory rtesF prom the iuropen nions side hs een pplied n import quot of QHHDHHH hetoliters representing n import penetrtion rtio of PFRS whih is even less thn the IP perentge points the retlitory rteF e onlude tht in IWWS trde reltions etween omniD fulgri nd rungry nd i were retlitoryF egriulturl negotitions hve een opened with rungry in PHHH nd omni nd fulgri in PHHPF sn PHHSD the retlitory rtes were P in omniD IW in fulgri nd S in rungryF he import penetrtion rtios were higher thn the retlitory rtes exept for fulgriF fut in PHHRD lierliztion ws hieved with ll three ountries in the smpleF xot less importnt is the lk of imlne etween the import penetrtion rtios nd export dependene onesF et optimumD they should e pproximtely equl nd higher thn the retlitory rtesF le P depits the most lned sitution for rungry in PHHSF sndeedD rungry eme memer of the iuropen nion sine wy PHHRF 4.2 Results and discussion e hve shown tht the dt smple ts our model nd we strt the empirE il test using the ordinry lest squres estimtion tehnique with pnel dt in eeF he dt hs een sled to mesure the smll ountry prodution in QHHDHHH hl respetively QDHHHDHHH hl for the lrge ountry9s produtionF he 13 dummy vrile hs een onstruted ssigning H vlue for the periods when the ountries were not involved in enlrgement negotitions over the egriulE turl ghpter nd I strting with the yer when the egriulturl ghpter hs een opened for negotitionF yne prtiulr se is the one of rungry who losed ll negotitions in PHHR when it eme full memer of the iuroE pen nion so tht we perform sensitivity nlysis estimting the model s if rungry would still negotite in PHHR nd PHHS versus unlned pnels with missing dummy vrile for rungry in the sme periodF he dt is trnsformed into logrithms to ensure normlity nd hetroskedstiityF he plot of the nturl logrithm of the lrge ountry9s import quot ginst time indites the existene of n outlier for fulgri in IWWW so tht we reestiE mte the model exluding the outlierF fefore proeeding with the nlysisD the rusmn test for the suitility of xed eets versus rndom eets for model estimtion is performedF e otin very smll rusmn sttisti so tht we proeed with the rndom eets modelF sn wodel I we estimte the model using import quotsF sn wodel P we inlude export dependene rtio s independent vrile to show orthogonlityF Table 3 . impiril estimtion of the retlitory gme e hve otined the expeted signs for the orreltionsF sndeedD under retlition the inrese of the lrge ountry quot won9t deter the smll ounE try from tightening its retlitory import quot so tht t lest one ountry hooses utrkyF o further understnd why this result ws possile onsider tht the lrge ountry epts lower volume of exports insted of the smll Table 6 . ensitivity nlysis of the retlitory gme SF Conclusion e hve shown tht retlitory poliy spe dened with 9importEexport9 quots is not xsh equilirium of the nonEoopertive gmeF he vetor spe model filittes very useful representtion of the strtegi intertion in trde euse it is possile to inorporte oth symmetri nd symmetri fetures of the plyersF sn our model the outome of the nonEoopertive trde gme is utrky ut despite our utrky result of retlition we would dvise utiousness in mking it generlF he result is dependent on the orthogE onlity of the vetor spe whih denes interntionl trdeF en extension of the pper is to reonsider retlition in n extended vetor spe y reE moving orthogonlityF yur results throw shed of light on retlition in trde reltionsF por poliy mkingD the model is importnt euse it speilly deE termines how muh should e restrited the volume of imports for retlition to strtD nmely IGQ from the politilly minimum eptle quotsF ixports eing etter outome of the retlitory gme explins why iISEgiig liE erliztion hs een possile despite the expnsionist volumes of exports on oth sidesF snresing dierene in the mrket size reinfores the protetionist stne while interntionl negotitions enet trdeF
